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1  | INTRODUC TION
Cooperation is a necessary element of groups. No matter which type 
of groups we are talking about—friends, work teams, and communi-
ties—the many social and economic benefits of groups can only be 
reaped if each individual group member is willing and able to devote 
their resources to the group and, thus, maximize its joint outcome. 
But the willingness to cooperate is highly contingent on mutual trust: 
trust is a form of social capital that helps maintaining group commit-
ment and cooperation. If group members distrust each other, they 
are less willing to cooperate, which is detrimental to group outcomes. 
However, trust is like a house of cards that takes time and effort to 
be built, but that can collapse very quickly: people are well aware 
that trust can be violated and that one's gullibility may be exploited. 
People hate being the “sucker” (Kerr, 1983; Vohs et al., 2007), which 
is why they carefully weigh the costs and benefits of trusting others, 
both in interpersonal as well as in intra- and intergroup situations 
(Deutsch, 1958, 1973).
The aversion toward being exploited by others varies between in-
dividuals: some are extremely vigilant toward the slightest cue that is 
associated with untrustworthiness, while others do not care as much. 
The personality variable that captures such individual differences has 
been referred to as “sensitivity to mean intentions” or simply “victim 
sensitivity” (Gollwitzer & Rothmund, 2009; Gollwitzer et al., 2005, 
2013). Victim sensitivity (VS) is one of the four “justice sensitivity” 
perspectives: it has been defined as the extent to which individuals 
perceive—and emotionally respond to—injustices to their own dis-
advantage: people high in VS experience more anger and moral out-
rage as a reaction to experienced or suspected injustice at their own 
costs (Schmitt et al., 2005). Importantly, people high in VS harbor 
an anxious expectation of being exploited by others and, therefore, 
tend to behave “pre-emptively selfish” in socially uncertain situations 
whenever there is a (small) danger of being exploited (Gollwitzer & 
Rothmund, 2011; Gollwitzer et al., 2009, 2012; Maltese et al., 2016; 
Rothmund et al., 2017; Süssenbach & Gollwitzer, 2015; for a review, 
see Gollwitzer et al., 2013). Thus, being victim-sensitive is a barrier to 
(re)build mutual trust, for instance, in romantic relationships (Gerlach 
et al., 2012), but possibly also in groups. Notably, previous research 
on the antisocial effects of VS has mainly focused on dyadic interac-
tions (e.g., Gollwitzer & Rothmund, 2011) and on the victim-sensitive 
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Abstract
Victim sensitivity (VS)—a personality trait reflecting the anxious expectation of being 
exploited—reliably predicts egoistic behavior in interpersonal situations. Here, we 
look at intragroup situations and investigate whether even one highly victim-sensi-
tive individual can have a detrimental effect of solidarity and cooperativeness on the 
entire group. Two studies—one field study with community residents from Philippine 
villages who played a solidarity game (N ≈ 800 individuals, 30 villages) and one lab 
study with participants in a small-group setting (N = 144 individuals, 48 groups) who 
played a public goods game—show that the highest VS score in a group negatively 
predicts solidarity and cooperation in the group, especially when external stressors 
(e.g., a natural disaster and a climate of distrust) are present and group-level resilience 
factors (e.g., in-group identification and task enjoyment) are absent. These results are 
relevant for research on the intragroup processes both from a basic as well as from 
an applied perspective.
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person's own willingness to trust and cooperate with others. In the 
present paper, we will address the question whether one victim-sensi-
tive group member can affect the entire group's willingness to behave 
prosocially and cooperatively toward each other. The hypothesis we 
started with was that even one highly victim-sensitive group member 
can decrease solidarity and cooperation within the entire group, even 
when the other group members are comparably less victim-sensitive.
1.1 | (Dis)trust and cooperation in groups
The majority of empirical studies on trust in groups has focused on 
trust formation (e.g., Jones & George, 1998)—the necessary conditions 
for building mutual trust in the “forming” phase (Tuckman, 1965)—or 
the fragility of trust maintenance and the conditions (i.e., risk factors) 
for trust to erode in groups (e.g., Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Sitkin & 
Roth, 1993). According to these studies, trust in groups erodes very 
quickly if one group member violates group-specific or generic norms 
of commitment, respect, or cooperation for the sake of maximizing 
their individual outcomes (i.e., free-riding or social loafing; Kerr, 1983). 
Notably, this literature focuses on the causal effect of factual free-rid-
ing behavior (of one group member) on mutual trust within the group. 
However, it is plausible to assume that even the mere anticipation of 
free-riding or social loafing can contribute to an erosion of trust and 
cooperation within a group. This assumption is backed up by empirical 
findings showing that cooperation is swiftly reduced when free-riding 
is non-costly (Fehr & Gächter, 2000) or difficult to observe and de-
tect (Karau & Williams, 1993; Williams et al., 1981): in these situations, 
group members are more likely to free-ride because they expect other 
group members to free-ride themselves (i.e., the “matching of effort” 
explanation for social loafing, see Jackson & Harkins, 1985; Karau & 
Williams, 1993).
Building on the assumption that VS reflects the anxious expecta-
tion of being exploited by others and that victim-sensitive individu-
als display this anxious expectation either verbally (i.e., by explicitly 
expressing their suspiciousness), non-verbally (i.e., by looking grim), 
or even behaviorally (i.e., by failing to cooperate; see Gollwitzer 
et al., 2013), they likely raise suspicions about potential free-riding 
among the other group members (Gollwitzer et al., 2015; see also 
Kramer, 1994, 1999). This can then contribute to an erosion of trust 
and cooperation in the entire group, even though the remaining 
group members may not be victim-sensitive at all. In this regard, dis-
trust is like a “virus” that can quickly spread in a group: one highly 
victim-sensitive individual may be enough to bring the fragile house 
of cards called interpersonal trust to collapse.
1.2 | Risk and resilience factors
Given the strong interdependence between trust and coopera-
tion, it is plausible to assume that the virus of distrust in a group 
also considerably affects group members' willingness to cooperate 
with each other. Notably, however, there are both risk factors that 
amplify the trust-cooperation effect, but also resilience factors that 
alleviate it. One risk factor is the extent to which conflicts of interest 
exist between members of the group, that is, when maximizing one's 
own individual payoff necessarily implies a reduction of the other 
group members' payoffs (i.e., negative interdependence, see Kelley 
& Thibaut, 1978), which is the case when valuable resources become 
scarce and, thus, no longer available to everybody to a sufficient de-
gree. In line with this reasoning, Balliet and Van Lange (2013) meta-
analytically showed that trust is a stronger predictor of cooperation 
in social dilemma situations characterized by strong (vs. weak) nega-
tive interdependence. Building on this and other findings, we expect 
groups that contain one highly victim-sensitive member to show less 
solidarity and cooperation than groups that do not contain a par-
ticularly victim-sensitive member, especially in times of crisis, when 
resources are scarce and conflicts of interest are strong.
Moreover, groups may also possess resources and resilience fac-
tors that stop the virus of distrust from spreading in the group. One 
of these resilience factors is the extent to which a group shares a 
sense of social identity—the extent to which group members con-
ceptualize themselves in terms of “we” instead of “I.” Groups with 
a strong social identity are more likely to cope with difficult group 
tasks (Haslam et al., 2004; Haslam & Reicher, 2006), with nega-
tive stereotypes and prejudices against the in-group (Branscombe 
et al., 1999), or with critical life events (Haslam et al., 2005; see also 
Jetten, Haslam, & Haslam, 2012). Thus, a strong and positive in-
group identity may buffer the detrimental effect of containing one 
highly victim-sensitive group member on solidarity and cooperation 
within the group.
In addition to social identity, research on group dynamics and 
group performance has shown that the nature of the task and the 
group's motivation to work on it can counteract adverse circum-
stances within the group. More specifically, if the task is perceived as 
meaningful and enjoyable, a group can excel even when some group 
members are unlikely (i.e., unwilling or unable) to contribute to the 
joint outcome (Karau & Williams, 1997; Williams & Karau, 1991). 
Task meaningfulness or enjoyment motivates strong group members 
to compensate for weaker members (see also Kerr, 2001). Thus, task 
enjoyment is another factor that may buffer the detrimental effect of 
having one (or more) highly victim-sensitive member in one's group.
1.3 | The present research
In this article, we will test the idea that even one highly victim-sensi-
tive individual can have a detrimental effect of solidarity and coop-
erativeness on the entire group—stated more technically, that the VS 
score of the most victim-sensitive group member negatively predicts 
solidarity and cooperation within the group, irrespective of the other 
group members' VS scores. In addition, we reasoned that this effect 
should be stronger in times of crisis, when resources are scarce and 
conflicts of interest are strong, and it should be alleviated by group-
level in-group identification and task enjoyment. These hypotheses 
were tested in two studies. Study 1 is a field study conducted with 
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community residents from Philippine villages who played a solidar-
ity game with their fellow villagers; Study 2 is a lab study with uni-
versity students who were randomly assigned into small groups in 
which they first completed a collaborative group task and then, a 
public goods game measuring each group member's willingness to 
cooperate in their group. In both studies, the central predictor was 
the VS score of the most victim-sensitive individual in the group (VS-
Max). This operationalization was preferred over other group-level 
aggregate measures, such as the average VS score in the group (VS-
Mean): given our assumption that even one single victim-sensitive 
group member can be detrimental to group outcomes, VS-Max is a 
more suitable indicator than VS-Mean, which is not only affected by 
the most victim-sensitive group member, but also by the VS scores 
of the other group members.
Because both studies yield nested data (i.e., participants nested 
in groups), we employed multilevel modeling to test our hypotheses. 
In that regard, it is important to note that although VS-Max is a score 
derived from one individual, it is a feature of the group—in multilevel 
modeling terms, a group-level variable. To properly model the group-
level (or “contextual”) effect of VS-Max, within-group variability in 
VS scores needs to be statistically controlled for (Kreft et al., 1995; 
Snijders & Bosker, 2011). This was achieved by including both VS-Max 
on the group-level (i.e., level-2) and VS scores on the individual-level 
(i.e., level-1; centered around their group means) simultaneously into 
the multilevel models (see Enders, 2013; Enders & Tofighi, 2007).
2  | STUDY 1:  VS-MA X REDUCES WITHIN-
GROUP SOLIDARIT Y IN TIMES OF CRISIS
2.1 | Methods
Study 1 was conducted in the Western Visayas (Region VI) in the 
province of Iloilo, The Philippines. A two-stage random sampling pro-
cedure was applied to select coastal villages and participants in the 
first wave. First, 30 barangays (i.e., the lowest administrative level in 
the Philippines, comparable to a village in rural areas) were randomly 
selected. Second, 27 household heads or their spouses per barangay 
were approached and invited to participate in a study on personality, 
trust, and cooperation (for details, see Vollan, 2019). Notably, the 
study had two measurement occasions, one in 2012 and the second 
in 2016, and an effort was made in 2016 to invite the same people 
who had also taken part 4 years before. Between 2012 and 2016, 
people of the Philippines were confronted with two challenging or 
even traumatic incidents. First, a major typhoon (“Haiyan”) hit the 
Philippines in November 2013. It was one of the strongest tropical 
cyclones ever recorded, and the deadliest Philippine typhoon on re-
cord. Our study site, Panay, was heavily affected by the typhoon 
with half of all houses being fully or partly destroyed. Given the low 
insurance coverage, people heavily depended on each other for mu-
tual aid. The second major incident was the presidential election of 
Rodrigo Duterte in May 2016, 2 months before the second data col-
lection took place. During the election campaign, Duterte divided 
the country into his supporters and the outsiders, or "enemies" of 
the country. Such a populist rhetoric filled with anger and resent-
ment typical for populist leaders continued during his presidency. 
Duterte especially dramatized the impact of drug cartels using a 
rhetoric of crisis and a wave of tough-on-crime policies.
Assuming that coping with Haiyan and the oppressive regime 
introduced in 2016 increased negative interdependence among par-
ticipants within villages, we explored whether the effect of VS-Max 
(in a village) on solidarity was stronger in 2016 than in 2012.
2.1.1 | Sample
In the 2012 wave, data from 795 participants could be used. Four 
years later (2016), people from the same 30 villages were recruited 
for a second wave of the study. This time, 810 participants com-
pleted the study. Among the 795 who had taken part in the 2012 
wave, 449 (i.e., 57%) also took part in the 2016 wave. Although the 
data from the two waves are not completely independent from each 
other, we will analyze the two waves separately here. Notably, the 
pattern of results remains robust (regarding significant and nonsig-
nificant effects, see below) when the analysis is only based on the 
449 participants who took part in both waves. The average age in 
2012 was 41.29 years (SD = 10.58, range 18–76 years), and 53.2% 
were female. In 2016 the average age was 45.09 years (SD = 10.91, 
range 19–78 years), and 66.8% were female. If the data were ana-
lyzed exclusively on the group-level (i.e., villages), n = 30 would be 
considered relatively low: with this sample size, only effects larger 
than f2 = .28 (equaling R2 = .22) would become statistically detect-
able (based on α = .05 and 1 − β = .80; see Faul et al., 2009) in an 
ordinary least squares regression analysis. One reason for using 
multilevel modeling here was, therefore, to increase the statistical 
power to detect our hypothesized effect.
2.1.2 | Procedure
The setup and procedure was roughly the same in both waves: 
Participants arrived at the “lab” (typically the village's town hall) and 
were given an ID card and assigned seats and a short paper-pencil 
survey. Participants were told that they would be paid a show-up fee 
plus earning depending on the outcomes of the games. Next, par-
ticipants completed several rounds of a solidarity game (see Selten 
& Ockenfels, 1998). Here, we report results from the first round of 
this game, in which solidarity transfers and solidarity beliefs were 
assessed. In subsequent rounds, several treatments (on the village-
level) were introduced to study, for instance, the effect of individual 
and group insurance on solidarity and how insurance uptake can be 
explained by risk attitudes. These rounds were designed as part of a 
different research project and are irrelevant for the current research 
question (Vollan, 2019).
Importantly, the solidarity game was played in three-person 
groups. Groups consisted of three villagers, where each originally 
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invited person was matched with one peer and one anonymous 
player (who was a peer of someone else). Thus, two players in each 
group knew each other and one person was anonymous to both. This 
allowed us to measure participants' solidarity both toward a known 
peer and toward an anonymous person (from the same village). In 
our analysis, we focus on the latter measure because it is not tainted 
by any reputational or reciprocity concerns that participants may 
have had and, thus, a cleaner measure of group-directed solidarity.
After answering any comprehension questions that participants 
had, they commenced with the economic games. After the games, 
participants completed a battery of survey measures, including the 




The specific solidarity game we employed here was adapted from 
Selten and Ockenfels (1998; see also Ockenfels & Weimann, 1999). 
Participants were told they had 200 pesos to start. Whether they 
could keep the 200 pesos or not was determined by a random pro-
cedure, an opaque bag with 3 balls in it, one for each player in the 
group. Out of the three balls, there were two white balls and one red 
ball. If the participants drew a white ball they could keep the 200 
pesos. If they drew a red ball they would lose the 200 pesos. This 
meant that one of the three players in each group would lose eve-
rything and two out of three would lose nothing. Before the draw, 
all players were asked whether and how much they would like to 
transfer to the other group members in case that they were unlucky, 
that is, if they drew a red ball and lost 200 pesos. They could transfer 
between 0 and 70 of the possible 200 pesos to the unlucky person. 
Importantly, we focused on the interaction with the unknown (i.e., 
randomly assigned) member of their three-person group; therefore, 
participants did not know who this other person was; they only 
knew s/he was also from their own village.
Amounts were in steps of 10 pesos starting at 0. Hence, pos-
sible transfers were 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, or 70. Participants 
were also asked how much they thought the other members in their 
group would transfer money to them if they were the loser. Again, 
responses were given in 10-pesos increments from 0–70, and they 
could earn an extra 10 pesos for each correct guess. Thus, the two 
dependent variables we will focus on here are the amount of pesos 
transferred to the unlucky player (“solidarity behavior”) and their 
guess about how much pesos their group members would transfer if 
they themselves were the losers (“solidarity expectations”).
Survey measures
Victim Sensitivity was measured with two items adapted from 
the Justice Sensitivity Inventory (Schmitt et al., 2010: “I am upset 
when others are better off than me” and “I am upset when others 
are undeservingly better off than me”). The items were translated 
from English into Hiligaynon and back in order to minimize semantic 
differences in item meaning. In the present sample, the item inter-
correlation was r = .48 in 2012 and r = .64 in 2016. The VS score 
of the most victim-sensitive individual in a village (VS-Max) was the 
central predictor variable in our models, and within-village variations 
in VS between participants were statistically controlled for in order 
to estimate the contextual effect properly (Snijders & Bosker, 2011). 
We computed VS-Max on the village-level (instead of the group-
level) because individuals knew their fellow villagers, but not who 
exactly they were playing with.
2.2 | Results and discussion
2.2.1 | Empty models
Given the nested structure of the data (i.e., individuals in groups—
level-1, groups in villages—level-2, and villages—level-3), multilevel 
modeling was employed to analyze the data. First, “intercept-only” 
(or “empty”) models were run to estimate the amount of variance 
in solidarity behavior and solidarity expectations on each level, for 
the 2012 and the 2016 data, respectively. In both years and for both 
variables, the largest amount of variance was due to differences 
between participants within groups (> 87.5%). The variability that 
was due to differences between groups within villages (i.e., level-2) 
and to differences between villages (i.e., level-3), respectively, were 
much smaller (<11.4%).
Means and standard deviations of solidarity behavior and solidar-
ity expectations (based on all individuals who participated in 2012 and 
2016, respectively), are reported in Table 1. The numbers clearly suggest 
that solidarity behavior decreased between 2012 and 2016. Looking 
only at the 449 individuals who participated in both waves (2012 and 
2016) suggests an intraindividual reduction in solidarity behavior (mean 
difference: 4.70, two-tailed 95% CI [2.28, 7.12], t(448) = 3.81, p < .001; 
d = .18), but not in solidarity expectations (mean difference: 1.63, two-
tailed 95% CI [−.73, 3.98], t(448) = 1.36, p = .18; d = .06).
2.2.2 | Hypothesis tests
We tested whether VS-Max (in a village) negatively predicts solidar-
ity behavior and solidarity expectations, and we explored whether 
TA B L E  1   Descriptive statistics (Study 1)
2012 2016
VS-Max (village-level) 4.64 (0.50) 4.08 (0.77)
VS (individual-level) 2.35 (1.15) 1.63 (0.92)
Solidarity behavior 
(individual-level)
30.42 (19.76) 25.98 (20.56)
Solidarity expectations 
(individual-level)
27.95 (19.10) 26.40 (20.75)
Note: Ns = 795 and 810 in 2012 and 2016, respectively. Standard 
deviations in parentheses.
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this effect was stronger in 2016 (i.e., in times of crisis) than in 2012. 
Random-intercepts models were specified and model parameters 
were estimated with the Maximum Likelihood method. Models were 
run for the 2012 and the 2016 data, separately, because only 57% of 
those participating in 2012 also participated in 2016.1 The results 
are displayed in Table 2.
In the 2012 data, VS-Max neither predicted solidarity behavior 
nor solidarity expectations. In the 2016 data, however, VS-Max had 
a significant negative effect on both dependent variables; in other 
words, the higher the VS score of the most victim-sensitive member 
of a particular village, the less did members of that village expect soli-
darity behavior from other villagers and the less they showed solidary 
behavior toward other villagers themselves. Solidarity behavior was 
highly correlated with solidarity expectations in both waves (2012: 
r = .68, p < .001; 2016: r = .63, p < .001). In addition, multilevel medi-
ation analyses (conducted with Mplus v8; Muthén & Muthén, 1998–
2017; see also Christ et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2009) suggest that, in 
2016, VS-Max had a significant indirect effect on solidarity behavior 
via solidarity expectations (B = −2.72, SE(B) = .50, p < .01), while the 
direct effect of VS-Max on solidarity behavior was no longer signifi-
cant after solidarity expectations had been controlled for (B = −.05, 
SE(B) = .61, p = .94; total effect: B = −2.76, SE(B) = .91, p = .002).
These findings are consistent with the idea that—especially in 
times of crisis—even one highly victim-sensitive group member can 
have a detrimental effect of solidarity within the entire group. That 
said, we cannot be sure whether the stronger effect of VS-Max on 
solidarity in 2016 compared to 2012 is causally due to the crises our 
participants were facing. We will discuss this potential limitation of 
our study in detail in the General Discussion.
3  | STUDY 2:  IN- GROUP IDENTIFIC ATION 
AND TA SK ENJOYMENT BUFFER 
THE EFFEC T OF VS-MA X ON GROUP 
COOPER ATION
Study 2 was designed to replicate the effect of VS-Max on group 
members' willingness to cooperate with each other in a more strongly 
controlled lab experiment. In this study, participants were invited 
(independently) into the lab and randomly assigned into groups of 
three. Cooperation was operationalized as participants' individual 
contributions in a public goods game—a standard measure of coop-
eration in behavioral economics (e.g., Allison & Messick, 1990; Van 
Dijk & Wilke, 1995). Before participants completed the public goods 
game individually, they spent some time working on a group task to-
gether. After that, task enjoyment and in-group identification were 
measured. This was done to test the hypothesized buffering effect 
of these two group-level factors on the (presumably detrimental) ef-
fect of VS-Max on group cooperation (Haslam et al., 2004; Haslam & 
Reicher, 2006; Karau & Williams, 1997).
3.1 | Methods
3.1.1 | Participants
This study took place in a German university-supported research lab. 
Students who are interested in participating in studies that are run-
ning in the lab can sign up for the participant pool and are informed 
about upcoming studies via email. Based on an a priori power analysis 
(detecting a medium-size interaction effect of f2 = .15 with a power 
of .80 would require a sample size of 55 groups in an ordinary least 
squares regression analysis conducted at the group-level without 
taking the multilevel structure of the data into account), we aimed 
for 55 groups × 3 members per group = 165 participants. Within the 
2 weeks in which the lab was available to us, 144 participants could 
be recruited, who were assigned to a total of 48 groups. Mean age 
was 26.41 (SD = 9.53, range 18–70), and 61.8% were female.
3.1.2 | Procedure
Participants arrived at the lab and registered with the lab manager. 
Next, they were randomly assigned a participant number and given a 
standing card with their participant number written on it. They were 
 1We also ran a model in which “wave” was included as a moderator (coded Wave 
2/2016 = 0 and Wave 1/2012 = 1). Mirroring the results reported in Table 3, we found a 
significant effect of VS-Max (p = .03), but no significant moderating effect of wave 
(p = .13). It should be noted, however, that this model violates the assumption of 
independent errors given that more than half of the participants took part in both waves 
of the study.





2012 2016 2012 2016
Fixed effects
Intercept 30.53 37.39 30.48 36.71
VS-Max (between 
villages)
−.06 −2.78* −.56 −2.51*
VS (within 
villagesa )




4.08 28.69 .51 8.53
Level-2 random 
intercepts
42.92** 8.46 24.14* b 
Level-1 residual 
variance
343.27** 381.58** 340.20** 417.58**
aTo estimate the contextual effect of VS-Max (on the village-level) 
properly, individual VS scores (centered around the village mean) were 
controlled. 
bIn this model, this parameter could not be estimated and was, 
therefore, set to 0. 
*p < .05; **p < .01 (two-tailed). 
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instructed to keep this card with them for the duration of the ses-
sion. Once the session began, all participants were first given a con-
sent form to read and sign. Next, they were given tablet computers 
to complete online survey materials (see below: Phase 1). When they 
were finished, the experimenter directed participants into rooms ac-
cording to their participant number so that there were two novel 
groups of three in two separate rooms. Groups were given printed 
instructions for the group task and the experimenter asked each 
group if they had any questions before they began working on an en-
joyable puzzle task (see below: Phase 2). The experimenter stopped 
the group work after 20 min regardless of how many puzzles partici-
pants had completed.
Next, participants completed measures about the group work 
and their perceptions of their group members (see below: Phase 
3). To do so, participants had their number cards visible on the 
table in order to facilitate the anonymous identification of other 
group members. Next, participants read the instructions for a pub-
lic goods game on the tablet. When they finished reading the in-
structions, participants were given a response sheet for the public 
goods game (see below: Phase 4). Finally, the experimenter calcu-
lated the payoff and reported this information to the lab manager. 
The participants were then dismissed one at a time to collect their 
reward from the lab manager; later, they received an email with a 
full debriefing.
3.1.3 | Measures
Phase 1: Survey measures
The measures participants completed before the start of the ex-
periment were: Age, gender, major, semester, nationality, mother 
tongue, a 10-item Victim Sensitivity scale (Schmitt et al., 2010; 
α = .790), and the Big-Five trait scales Openness (α = .751), 
Neuroticism (α = .715), Conscientiousness (α = .679), Extraversion 
(α = .828), and Agreeableness (α = .581) taken from the German short 
version (Rammstedt & John, 2005) of the Big-Five Inventory (John 
et al., 1991). Response scales ranged between 0 (“do not agree at all”) 
to 5 (“agree completely”).
Phase 2: Puzzle task
The task was to solve a total of eight group puzzles that were 
adapted from www.escap e-team.com. This site provides printable 
materials and an accompanying app, which gave feedback if the an-
swer was correct. Participants could not move on to subsequent 
puzzles without entering the correct five-digit answer code which 
was the solution to the puzzle. Groups worked on this task for ex-
actly 20 min, and they solved between 1 and 5 puzzles during that 
time (M = 1.92, SD = 1.21).
Phase 3: Group perceptions
After the puzzle phase participants first gave their impressions 
about working with their group as a whole on 6-point Likert scales 
ranging from 0 (“do not agree at all”) to 5 (“agree completely”): Task 
Enjoyment, eight items developed specifically for the purpose of 
the present study (e.g., “I enjoyed the group work.” α = .93), and 
In-Group Identification, eight items put together from other estab-
lished measures, including the single-item measure of identifica-
tion proposed by Postmes et al. (2013) as well as items from Leach 
et al.'s (2008) self-investment scale (e.g., “I feel solidarity with my 
group.” α = .93).
Phase 4: Public goods game
The main dependent variable here was participants' behavior in the 
public goods game. The public goods game we used was with con-
tinuous contributions and without a threshold. Participants were 
told they had 10 points (i.e., initial endowment, with 3 points worth 
1 €) and asked how many points they wished to contribute to the 
group pot. Any points contributed to the pot were multiplied by 2 
and the pot would be divided evenly between the three members 
in the group. Any points not in the pot were kept by the participant. 
The range for possible outcomes for payout was 6.66 points (if a 
participant put in their whole pot and neither of the other players 
contributed anything) to 20 points (if everyone contributed all of 
their points to the pot). Therefore, from this part of the experiment, 




Given the nested structure of the data (participants nested in 
groups), multilevel modeling was employed to analyze the data and 
test our hypotheses. First, intercept-only (“empty”) models were run 
to estimate the amount of variance in contribution on each level. 
The largest amount of variance was due to differences between par-
ticipants within groups (94%), while 6% of the variance was due to 
differences between groups.
3.2.2 | Hypothesis tests
We predicted that VS-Max decreases an individual's contribution to 
the public good, and that this effect is attenuated by task enjoyment 
and in-group identification. This hypothesis also implies multilevel 
modeling. Therefore, within-group VS (centered around the group 
mean) was added as a covariate in order to properly estimate the 
hypothesized contextual effect (Snijders & Bosker, 2011). Three 
models were specified, one without any moderator variable (Model 
1), one including the moderator Task Enjoyment (Model 2), and one 
including the moderator In-Group Identification (Model 3). In its ran-
dom part, each model includes level-2 random intercepts, random 
slopes (of within-group VS), the covariance between intercepts and 
slopes, and a level-1 error term. Model parameters were estimated 
via Maximum Likelihood; effects based on directional hypotheses 
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will be interpreted on the basis of one-tailed tests. The results are 
displayed in Table 3.
In line with our theorizing, both task enjoyment (one-tailed 95% 
CI [.42, +∞]) and in-group identification (one-tailed 95% CI [.16, +∞]) 
moderated the effect of VS-Max on cooperation. These two inter-
action effects are graphically displayed in Figure 1. Looking at the 
simple effects, VS-Max only reduced cooperation when collective 
task enjoyment (B = −1.96, SE(B) = .69, p = .004) and/or collective 
in-group identification (B = −1.30, SE(B) = .58, p = .03) were low (i.e., 
1 SD below the grand mean), but not when they were high (i.e., 1 SD 
above the grand mean; task enjoyment: B = .15, SE(B) = .54, p = .79; 
in-group identification: B = .56, SE(B) = .80, p = .42).
To scrutinize the specific effect of VS (over and above broader 
personality traits such as the “Big Five;” Digman, 1990) more strictly, 
we re-ran our models by including the “big five” as covariates on the 
individual-level. In Model 1 (without any moderator variables; see 
Table 3), we found significant negative effects of conscientiousness 
(B = −.75; SE(B) = .30; p = .01) and extraversion (B = −.48; SE(B) = .23; 
p = .04) on cooperation in the public goods game, but, importantly, 
the main effect of VS-Max still remained significant and even be-
came stronger (B = −.90, SE(B) = .42; p = .04) after controlling for 
these traits. Also, the interaction effect between VS-Max and task 
enjoyment in Model 2 (B = 1.55, SE(B) = .76; p = .05) and the mar-
ginal interaction effect between VS-Max and in-group identification 
in Model 3 (B = 1.56, SE(B) = .85; p = .07) were unaffected by in-
cluding the “Big Five” into the respective models. This suggests that 
the effect of VS that we found here is indeed specific and cannot be 
reduced to the effects of broader personality traits.
4  | GENER AL DISCUSSION
In two studies, we found that the most victim-sensitive member in a 
group—in other words, the “VS-Max” score of a group—can reduce 
solidarity and cooperation within the group, especially in times of 
crisis (Study 1). Task enjoyment and in-group identification, however, 
can buffer this effect (Study 2). The victim sensitivity of a single in-
dividual can, thus, affect an entire group's outcomes, a finding that 
is not only theoretically, but also practically relevant, and that may 
inspire future research looking at the complex inter- and interper-
sonal effects that personality traits (such as VS) can have on group 
outcomes—a field that has been growing over the last 25 years (e.g., 
Barrick et al., 1998; Driskell, Salas, & Driskell, 2018; Kozlowski & 
Chao, 2018; Kramer et al., 2014; Ostermeier et al., 2020).
Both studies used diverse methodological approaches and sam-
ples, which can be regarded both an asset and a problem. Study 
1 sampled participants from 30 villages in the Philippines at two 
measurement occasions: before (2012) and during (2016) a time of 
societal challenges, both ecologically (i.e., before and after a major 
Typhoon hit many of these villages) and politically (i.e., before and 
after the election of a tough-on-crime leader). The results show that 
VS-Max negatively predicted participants' solidarity in a standard-
ized economic game during, but not before these societal challenges 
occurred. Although this finding is consistent with our reasoning 
that VS-Max has a stronger detrimental effect in times of crisis, it 
is important to note that we can only assume that 2016 was more 
of a “time-of-crisis” year in the Philippines than 2012. Many other 
factors might be responsible for the different results found in 2016 
versus 2012, so the empirical evidence obtained in Study 1 must be 
considered preliminary. Also, regarding the second issue, we do not 
know exactly which social and/or cognitive processes underlie the 
effect of VS-Max on solidarity in 2016. Thus, more direct evidence 
is needed to test the idea that in times of crisis, the virus of distrust 
spreads more easily and decreases group members' willingness to 
help each other.
Study 2 was conducted in a more strongly controlled setting: 
participants were assigned randomly into groups in the lab, and in 
a first phase, these groups worked together on a puzzle task. This 
task allowed them to experience their groupness and to establish 
a level of mutual trust and, more importantly, a sense of in-group 
identification. Afterward, we measured each group members' will-
ingness to contribute to the group (i.e., their cooperation) in a public 
goods game. Again, in line with our theorizing, we found a detrimen-
tal effect of the most victim-sensitive group member's VS score on 
cooperation, unless the group enjoyed their task and/or identified 
strongly with their group. This finding suggests that task enjoyment 
and in-group identification can buffer the detrimental effect of hav-
ing a highly victim-sensitive member in the group. Of course, from 
the data obtained in Study 2, we cannot specify which aspects of the 
group work in Phase 1 (i.e., the puzzle task) contributed to a shared 
sense of task enjoyment or made participants identify with their 
group, but due to our random assignment of participants into groups, 
we can eliminate the possibility that such identification processes 
TA B L E  3   Estimated model parameters for multilevel models 
(Study 2)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Fixed effects
Intercept 11.16 47.44 34.23
VS-Max (Level-2) −.72†  −9.05* −6.25*
VS within groups (Level-1) −.01 −.03 −.06
Moderator Level-2a  −7.39* −6.79† 
Moderator Level-1a  .15 −.003




Level-2 random intercept 
variance
.68 .41 .45






Level-1 error variance 5.38** 5.39** 5.40**
aIn Model 2, the moderator was task enjoyment. In Model 3, the 
moderator was in-group identification. 
bThis parameter could not be estimated due to a lack of convergence; 
thus, it was fixed to 0. 
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01 (two-tailed). 
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were simply due to a better knowledge of each other or a shared 
group history.
It is important to repeat that, based on our findings and the 
methodology of both studies, we cannot pinpoint the exact inter- 
or intrapersonal processes underlying the effect of VS-Max on 
solidarity and cooperation in groups. Our hypothesis was based 
on the idea that victim-sensitive individuals are strongly motivated 
to avoid being duped (Gollwitzer & Rothmund, 2009; Gollwitzer 
et al., 2013), and that this avoidance motivation is picked up by the 
other group members, either because it is verbally or non-verbally 
communicated or manifests behaviorally in uncooperative behavior 
(“pre-emptive selfishness”), thus producing a self-fulfilling prophecy 
(Gollwitzer et al., 2015). In other words, the latent distrust harbored 
by victim-sensitive individuals is like a “virus” that spreads quickly 
in a group and contributes to a collapse of mutual trust and, when 
negative interdependence is strong, also to cooperation. Future re-
search should elaborate on this “virus” analogy and the specific inter- 
and intrapersonal processes underlying this effect.
One specific idea could be to investigate communicative pro-
cesses in groups. Based on the idea that negative interdependence 
amplifies the effect of mutual trust on cooperation (Balliet & Van 
Lange, 2013), victim-sensitive group members may exert a greater 
communicative influence in such negative interdependence situ-
ations. In situations characterized by less negative (or maybe even 
positive) interdependence, in contrast, victim-sensitive group mem-
bers may have a weaker social influence on others. Here, it is easier 
for groups to create a climate of social acceptance and procedural 
justice (Tyler & Lind, 1992) than to anxiously assess each other's 
commitment and trustworthiness.
4.1 | Limitations and open questions
Victim sensitivity—the central predictor variable in this research—
was always measured, never manipulated in any of our studies. This 
is, of course, justifiable given that VS represents a personality trait 
F I G U R E  1   Effect of VS-Max on 
cooperation moderated by (a) task 
enjoyment (upper panel) and (b) in-group 
identification (lower panel) (Study 2)
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(Schmitt et al., 2005, 2010), but from an experimentalist's perspec-
tive, one might wonder whether we can make any causal claims with 
our research. Indeed, we believe that we can. First, it is very im-
plausible to assume a reverse causal effect, that is, that participants' 
solidarity (Study 1) or cooperation (Study 2) causally influenced their 
VS. Second, in both studies, we showed that—under certain circum-
stances—the VS score of the most victim-sensitive group member 
impacts the entire groups' solidarity and cooperation. Again, given 
the random assignment procedure, the effect of VS-Max on solidar-
ity or cooperation is unlikely to be confounded by contextual fac-
tors. Third, by measuring the “Big Five” in Study 2, we were able to 
rule out that the effect of VS-Max can be reduced to the effects 
of broader personality traits. Thus, taken together, the risk that our 
findings might not reflect causal effects of VS-Max on group out-
comes can be considered relatively small.
That said, future research might well try to test this causal 
effect more rigidly by attempting to manipulate or amplify VS 
experimentally. Some studies suggest that this is doable: For in-
stance, Süssenbach and Gollwitzer (2015; Study 2) and Süssenbach 
et al. (2016; Study 2) manipulated the risk of being exploited ex-
perimentally and showed that victim-sensitive individuals reacted 
more strongly to such a manipulation than victim-insensitive indi-
viduals. Such a manipulation could be used in future studies to test 
the hypothesis that VS-Max causally affects group outcomes more 
rigidly.
Related to this issue, it is important to see that neither of the 
moderator variables investigated in the present studies (time of crisis 
in Study 1; task enjoyment and in-group identification in Study 2) 
was experimentally manipulated here. This is definitely a limitation 
of the present research. Future research should (a) define the con-
ditions amplifying or alleviating an effect of VS-Max on solidarity or 
cooperation within the group more specifically and (b) manipulate 
the respective moderator variables experimentally. For instance, 
groups could be artificially put into a challenging situation—similar to 
the challenges we discussed in the context of Study 1—by installing 
a tough, abusive (vs. generous, supportive) group leader or by con-
fronting the group with aversive, but uncontrollable events in the 
course of their group work. Likewise, task enjoyment could be ex-
perimentally manipulated using either an objectively enjoyable (vs. 
tedious) task in the forming phase of the group. In sum, future re-
search should use stronger experimental designs and larger samples 
to illuminate the effect of VS-Max on solidarity and cooperation in 
groups as well as the processes underlying this effect more strictly. 
Stronger studies with potent manipulations of boundary conditions 
should also result in effect sizes that are larger than the ones we 
observed in the two studies presented here.
It should also be noted that the list of boundary conditions that 
we investigated here is far from exhaustive. Other boundary condi-
tions of the effect of VS-Max on group outcomes are conceivable 
and should be systematically investigated by future research. For in-
stance, group size, group homo- versus heterogeneity, physical prox-
imity between group members, the possibility to interact with group 
members, tight versus loose group roles, the presence of a group 
leader, leadership styles, etc. may moderate the effect of VS-Max 
on group outcomes. In addition, culture, organizational climate, and 
other macro-level factors may play an important role. Importantly, 
the present research draws attention to the possibility that a single 
personality trait of a single individual deteriorates group functioning 
and group outcomes. Future research in personality and social psy-
chology may thrive from a better understanding of which personal-
ity factors are likely to act virus-like in groups and which personality 
factors and/or situational factors vaccinate against that influence. 
With regard to a virus-like influence, the “dark triad” traits (Paulhus 
& Williams, 2002) are likely candidates as having one person in a 
group with high values on either narcissism, Machiavellianism, or 
psychopathy could be considered a breeding ground for negative 
group dynamics.
4.2 | Conclusion
Trust and cooperation in groups are difficult to maintain when group 
members anxiously expect others to exploit them. Here, we showed 
for the first time that even one single victim-sensitive member of 
a group can reduce solidarity and cooperation within the group 
under certain circumstances. Establishing this empirical knowledge 
is important for basic as well as for applied research. Basic research 
needs to elucidate the specific inter- and intrapersonal processes 
underlying the effect of group-level VS on solidarity and coopera-
tion. Applied research should use this knowledge to develop effec-
tive intervention strategies to reduce the detrimental effects of 
victim sensitivity in groups in order to facilitate a climate of trust 
and to maximize a collective willingness to help and cooperate with 
each other.
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